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Abstract: This paper provides an empirical, comparative, and devel-
opment perspective on the corporate veil doctrine. It contains a compre-
hensive survey of the corporate veil cases in Hong Kong. The survey
results are then compared with comparable surveys of the US cases to
highlight relevant characteristics in the Hong Kong courts' approach to
the doctrine. The paper also analyses the doctrine and the limited liabil-
ity principle in a development perspective to suggest that the Hong
Kong courts should apply the doctrine more assertively to address
externalization of corporate business costs, which is the inevitable con-
sequence of limited liability.
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I. Introduction
The lifting of corporate veil doctrine remains one of the most difficult
areas of Hong Kong company law. There is a dearth of overarching
guiding principles for a body of largely incoherent case law.' On the
one hand, some of the leading cases, such as China Ocean Shipping v
Mitrans Shipping' and Bakri Bunker Trading v The Neptune,3 suggest
that Hong Kong courts share the reservations of the English courts
towards the doctrine. On the other hand, the courts readily applied
the doctrine to achieve justice in a number of cases. In addition, the
Hong Kong courts have shown a conflicting attitude regarding the
* BA (Yale), JD (Harvard), BCL (Oxon); Attorney & Counsellor, New York State;
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, the University of Hong Kong; e-mail: thomas
k cheng@yahoo.com. The author wishes to acknowledge the able research
assistance of Alex Lee and Ginny Ng in compiling the survey of Hong Kong
corporate veil cases. This paper would not have been possible without them.
1 One Hong Kong commentator noted that '[i]t is, however, difficult to state precisely
when the courts will do so in a particular case and there is no precise test or
criteria upon which the courts may rely': P. Kwan, Hong Kong Corporate Law, 1st
edn (Lexis-Nexis: Hong Kong, 2006) 88.
2 [1995] 3 HKC 123, HKCA.
3 [1986] HKLR 345, HKC.
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proper basis for veil lifting, in particular on the role of justice. In Good
Profit Development v Leung Hoi, the Hong Kong High Court declared
justice a sufficient basis for invoking the doctrine.' This contrasts with
the sentiment expressed in Nazareth V-P's judgment in China Ocean,
in which he cited Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law and
Adams v Cape Industries for the proposition that justice alone does
not justify the imposition of shareholder liability.'
Despite this apparent lack of consensus, there are signs that the
Hong Kong judiciary has become more receptive of the doctrine in
recent years. The courts have sided with the claimant in the five most
recent corporate veil cases dating back to 2004. Lee Sow Keng v Kelly
McKenzie,' a Hong Kong Court of Appeal case decided in 2004, was
notable for its boldness in ignoring the separate legal personalities of
the two companies in the case. This decision was all the more remark-
able because its facts and outcome are very similar to the English case
of Creasey v Breachwood Motors,' which was subsequently overruled
in Ord & Anor v Belhaven Pubs.' The Hong Kong court reached a
different outcome in the face of practically identical facts as those in
Creasey. The divergent outcomes of these two cases signal willingness
on the part of the Hong Kong judges to deviate from the prevailing
English approach and use the veil lifting doctrine to achieve justice.
A comprehensive understanding of the existing cases is essential to
any meaningful discussion of the corporate veil doctrine. Current
perceptions of the doctrine are largely informed by a number of lead-
ing judgments. While such generalizations are useful, they fail to pro-
vide a complete picture. The leading cases may not represent the
general judicial attitude towards the doctrine. Moreover, the fact-
sensitive nature of corporate veil cases means that a minor change of
facts may alter the outcome of the case. In order to obtain a more
complete understanding of the doctrine, an extensive empirical study
of the existing cases will be conducted in this paper. As far as the
author is aware, no such study has ever been done of the Hong Kong
corporate veil cases. One of the goals of this paper is to fill this gap in
the academic literature. The value of such an empirical study was
confirmed by Professor Robert Thompson's surveys of the US corpor-
ate veil cases, which challenged some long-held beliefs about the
corporate veil doctrine in the US.9 Similar to Thompson's surveys, the
survey in this paper will investigate whether the claimant's success
4 [1992] 2 HKC 539, HKHC.
5 [1995] 3 HKC 123, HKCA.
6 [2004] 3 HKLRD 517, HKCA.
7 [1992] BCC 638, QBD.
8 [1998] BCC 607, CA.
9 R. Thompson, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study' (1991) 76 Cornell
Law Review 1036 (hereinafter Thompson I); R. Thompson, 'Piercing the Veil Within
Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors' (1999) 12
Connecticut Journal of International Law 379 (hereinafter Thompson II).
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rate varies in accordance with factors such as the nature of the under-
lying claims at issue, the number and identity of shareholders in the
company, the time when the case was decided, etc. It will also verify
some common perceptions of the doctrine.
Aside from this empirical study, the application of the corporate
veil doctrine in Hong Kong can be further illuminated by comparative
analysis. The most obvious jurisdiction with which to compare would
be the UK, given the close lineage of these two jurisdictions. However,
it is precisely because of this lineage that a comparison with English
cases may not produce useful insights. The Hong Kong courts have
borrowed English precedents extensively in the past. Their approach
to the doctrine has been largely in line with that of the English courts
until Lee Sow Keng.'o Meanwhile, with the assistance of Thompson's
surveys, a systematic comparison can be made with the American
case law. This comparison will be particularly illuminating given that
the American courts tend to focus on different factors when applying
the doctrine. Instead of concepts commonly found in the English
cases such as agency, trusteeship, and the single economic unit
theory, the American courts emphasize factors such as capitalization
of the company, separation of the assets of the company and its mem-
bers, and observance of corporate formalities." This comparative
study will hopefully yield useful insights into the Hong Kong courts'
approach to the doctrine.
After the empirical study and comparative analysis, this paper will
proceed to consider the proper role for the doctrine in Hong Kong
company law. This requires an appreciation of the practical social
impact of the corporate veil doctrine and the principle of limited
liability. Strict adherence to that principle means that companies will
escape their liabilities and leave their creditors unpaid once their
assets are exhausted. This results in the externalization of business
costs to the counterparties of the company, which is obviously un-
desirable. To put it differently, these counterparties are made to pro-
vide an implicit subsidy to the company's business activities. This
paper argues that while implicit subsidies to businesses may be justi-
fied when an economy is industrializing and pursuing rapid economic
growth, they are highly questionable for advanced economies such as
Hong Kong's. Once an economy has attained a sufficiently high level
of development, there are no persuasive justifications for businesses
not to bear the full costs of their activities. The corporate veil doctrine
10 In fact, during colonial times, English cases were binding on the Hong Kong
courts. After the return of sovereignty to China in 1997, English cases remain
highly persuasive. Hong Kong judges still cite English company law cases
extensively.
11 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1063-8; R. Hamilton, 'The Corporate Entity' (1971)
49 Texas Law Review 979 at 982-94; C. Krendl and J. Krendl, 'Piercing the
Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry' (1978) 55 Denver Law Journal 1 at 15-17;
D. Barber, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil' (1981) 17 Willamette Law Review 371 at
374-5.
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needs to be applied more liberally to mitigate these undesirable ef-
fects. A development perspective of the doctrine advocates an ex-
panded role for it in Hong Kong.
This paper contains three further sections. Section II summarizes
the results of the empirical study of Hong Kong corporate veil cases
conducted by the author. The survey begins with a pool of 119 cases in
which the corporate veil doctrine is mentioned or in some way impli-
cated. These cases are analysed along various dimensions and trends
in the case law will be deduced. Results from the analysis are then
compared with those from Thompson's surveys. Where appropriate,
there will be a more detailed discussion and comparison of the Hong
Kong and the American cases. Section III adopts a developmental
perspective on the corporate veil doctrine and limited liability. It ex-
plains how limited liability results in externalization of business costs
and compels members of society to confer implicit subsidies on cor-
porate activities. It argues that while strict adherence to limited liabil-
ity may have served a useful purpose during the rapid development of
Hong Kong's economy between the 1950s and the 1980s, such implicit
subsidies are no longer necessary or justified. Section IV concludes
the paper.
II. An Empirical Study of Corporate Veil Cases in
Hong Kong
In light of the diverse factual circumstances in corporate veil cases
and the lack of overarching guiding principles under the doctrine, the
most systematic way to study these cases is through a general survey.
Moreover, North American commentators have made some theoret-
ical assertions about the corporate veil doctrine, including: first, in
light of a tort victim's lack of prior opportunity to negotiate with the
tortfeasor for compensation, courts should be more ready to pierce
the veil in tort as opposed to contract cases; secondly, it is less of an
affront to the limited liability principle to pierce the veil against a
corporate shareholder because the ultimate individual shareholders
of the corporate shareholder still enjoy limited liability protection;
thirdly, the greater is the number of shareholders, the lower is the
success rate for the plaintiff; and fourthly, undercapitalization of
the corporation is one of the most important considerations in veil
piercing cases.12 It was not possible to verify these assertions until
Thompson's surveys, which contradicted a number of them. For
example, Thompson showed that the American courts are in fact less
likely to pierce the veil in tort cases than in contract cases.' 3 They are
also more likely to pierce the veil against an individual shareholder as
12 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1063-8.
13 Ibid.
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opposed to a corporate shareholder.14 The goal of this survey of the
Hong Kong corporate veil cases is to decipher trends in them and to
verify whether these theoretical assertions hold true for them.
The author conducted a comprehensive search for corporate veil
cases in Hong Kong covering four databases, including Westlaw,
Lexis-Nexis, the Hong Kong Legal Information Institute website, and
the Hong Kong Judiciary website. Every case in these databases
which mentions the phrase 'corporate veil' was included in the initial
pool of 119 cases. Of these 119 cases, the corporate veil doctrine was
tangentially at issue in 78 of them, of which the integrity of the separ-
ate corporate personality was at stake in 41 of them. These 41 cases
can be further divided into two categories. The first category consists
of cases in which separate corporate personality was at stake, but
setting it aside would not have resulted in the imposition of share-
holder liability. One example of such cases is the famous DHN case
decided by the English Court of Appeal." In that case, the parent
company asked the court to treat three members of a corporate group
as one entity for the purpose of assessing compensation for a govern-
ment compulsory purchase. No liability was at stake. This type of
corporate veil cases has been labelled as 'identification'16 cases or
'looking behind the veil'17 cases. The corporate veil is set aside to
identify the company with its members. There are 14 of them in the
survey.
The second category consists of cases in which shareholder liability
was at issue. These are genuine corporate veil cases in the sense that
the limited liability principle is overridden. Notable examples of such
cases include Adams v Cape Industries and Creasey v Breachwood
Motors.18 There are 27 of them in the survey. These 27 cases are
dwarfed by the over 3,800 corporate veil cases Thompson managed to
locate.1 9 While Hong Kong is obviously a much smaller jurisdiction
than the 50 states of the USA plus its federal court system, Hong Kong
is a major financial centre where entrepreneurship is vibrant. As of
November 2009, there were 766,382 local companies listed on the
Companies Register in Hong Kong.20 This means that there is more
than one company per ten persons. In fact, the number of registered
local companies increased by close to 40 per cent between 2004 and
2009.21 Given the prevalence of companies, one would expect a much
14 Ibid.
15 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1
WLR 852, CA.
16 K. van de Kerckhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 1st edn (Kluwer Law
International: Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007) 13-14.
17 See S. Ottolenghi, 'From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil to Ignoring it
Completely' (1990) 53(3) MLR 338.
18 [1990] Ch 433, CA; [1992] BCC 638, QBD.
19 See Thompson II, above n. 7 at 385.
20 Companies Registry, Statistics-Number of Local Companies on Register in 2009,
available at: http://www.cr.gov.hk/en/statistics/statistics_01.htm.
21 Ibid.
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higher number of corporate veil cases. A number as low as 27 sug-
gests that, for whatever reason, the corporate veil doctrine is rarely
invoked in Hong Kong. One possible explanation may be that claim-
ants are discouraged from challenging limited liability due to a per-
ceived low probability of success. It will be interesting to see if this
perception is substantiated by the cases. Before proceeding to analyse
the results, one cautionary note is in order. The small sample size of
this survey means that whatever observations and inferences drawn
from it must be interpreted with care. As is true of any kind of statist-
ical study, reliability is diminished as the sample size becomes smaller.
With the small sample size of this survey, conclusions can only be
confidently drawn if the variations in trends are substantial.
On a theoretical level, one may expect the US courts to be more
ready than the Hong Kong courts to lift the veil in light of the conces-
sionaire approach to incorporation under US law. Under US corpora-
tion law, the benefits of incorporation are a privilege granted by the
sovereign. There is thus a stronger theoretical basis for the with-
drawal of such benefits when the corporate form has been abused.
What the legislature grants it can also revoke. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York articulated this view
in Mull v Colt, declaring that '[c] ertainly a concomitant of the favor of
the sovereign in permitting a corporate form of doing business is that
the conduct of the entity be compatible with the public interest. The
corporate fiction is but a matter of commercial convenience; the con-
cept is not to be extended beyond reason and policy.'22 This is to be
contrasted with the contractual approach to incorporation under
Anglo-Hong Kong law, under which the constitutional documents of a
company are deemed to be a contract between the company and its
members and the members inter se.23 incorporation is not a privilege
granted by the sovereign, but a process initiated by and premised
upon the will of private parties. Therefore, one may argue that veil
lifting is more susceptible to the charge of interference with private
contractual right under Anglo-Hong Kong law than under US law,
and hence more difficult for the Hong Kong courts to defend and
countenance.
The first observation about the survey results is that, contrary to
the general perception, the Hong Kong courts have been quite willing
to lift the veil. Among the 41 cases in which separate corporate per-
sonality was at stake, the courts lifted the veil in 18 of them. The
claimant success rate was 43.9 per cent, which is in fact higher than
that among the US cases. Thompson found that the plaintiff suc-
ceeded in roughly 40 per cent of the US corporate veil cases." This
22 31 FRD 154 at 166 (SDNY 1962).
23 P. Davies, Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th edn (Sweet &
Maxwell: London, 2008) 65-6.
24 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1048.
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result is surprising given the Hong Kong courts' generally conservat-
ive reputation. In fact, if one focuses on the second category of cases,
the genuine corporate veil cases, the claimant success rate was 48 per
cent. Of the 27 cases, the veil was lifted in 13 of them. This result
further belies the Hong Kong judiciary's reputation of cautiousness
towards veil lifting. Given this high rate of success, the dearth of
corporate veil cases in Hong Kong is even more surprising. It is pos-
sible that potential claimants' perception of their likelihood of success
is tainted by a few prominent cases in which the court refused to lift
the veil.
i. The Nature of the Underlying Claims at Issue
The subsequent analysis will focus on the 27 genuine corporate veil
cases. Among them, 14 involved contractual claims, none involved
tort claims, five were criminal cases, and eight arose in a statutory
context. It is surprising that no corporate veil claim has ever been
raised in a tort case in Hong Kong. It has been suggested by North
American commentators that the courts should be more ready to lift
the veil in tort cases. As mentioned earlier, this was contradicted by
the results from Thompson's surveys. He found that US courts pierced
the veil in 42 per cent of the contract cases and 31 per cent of the tort
cases." He further found that US courts pierced the veil in 67 per cent
of the criminal cases and 41 per cent of those cases involving statutory
claims.26 In light of the absence of corporate veil cases premised on
tort claims in Hong Kong, it is impossible to verify whether the courts
are more ready to lift the veil in tort cases. The Hong Kong courts
lifted the veil in five of the 14 contract cases, or 35.7 per cent of them.
Consistent with the trends in the US, the Hong Kong courts have
more aggressively applied the doctrine in criminal cases. Of the five
corporate veil cases arising in the criminal context, the courts lifted
the veil in four, or 80 per cent, of them. Lastly, the Hong Kong courts
have lifted the veil in a higher percentage of statutory cases than have
the US courts. Of the eight cases predicated on statutory claims, the
Hong Kong courts lifted the veil in five, or 62.5 per cent, of them.2 7
Therefore, in Hong Kong, claimant success rates vary according to the
nature of the underlying claims. Criminal cases have seen the highest
success rate, followed by statutory cases, and then by contractual
cases. This is roughly consistent with the trend in the US.
25 Ibid. at 1058, 1069. The difference in success rate is smaller once one takes out the
misrepresentation cases. The American courts pierced the veil in 34 per cent of the
contract cases not involving misrepresentation and 27 per cent of the tort cases not
involving misrepresentation.
26 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1058.
27 Adding all the cases in which the veil was lifted in the three categories, there are in
fact 14 of them, which is one more than the 13 successful corporate veil cases
mentioned above. The reason is that one of them consisted of both contractual and
statutory claims.
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(a) Criminal Cases
It is worth pondering the variations in success rate among different
case types. As far as criminal cases are concerned, the greater judicial
willingness to lift the veil could be attributed to the fact that the courts
do not want to allow defendants to escape criminal sanctions through
the use of the corporate form. HKSAR v Leung Yat Ming aptly illus-
trates this.28 In that case, the defendants attempted to circumvent
university regulations on the use of housing allowance by incorporat-
ing a company. Those regulations prohibited university employees
from using their housing allowance to purchase property. It could
only be used for rental payment. The defendants attempted to bypass
this prohibition by incorporating a company to purchase the prop-
erty, which was subsequently leased to them by the company. The
court did not hesitate to impute ownership of the property to the two
defendants, which rendered them in violation of a criminal statute. In
the court's view, the corporate form cannot be used in such a trans-
parent manner to circumvent the university regulations.
At first glance, the view expressed by the Leung Yat Ming court
seems convincing. The court's view was that the policy objective of a
criminal statute should not be frustrated by the use of the corporate
form. By choosing to criminalize certain conduct, the legislature has
indicated the reprehensibility of that conduct and the importance of
deterring it. The legislature's judgment should be honoured to the
greatest extent possible, including by overriding the separate person-
ality of companies. However, the contrary view is that given the moral
stigma of a criminal conviction and the high burden of proof required
of the prosecution in establishing a criminal offence, the corporate
veil should not be lightly lifted.29 The defendants in Leung Yat Ming
had not been put on adequate notice of the criminal consequences of
their action. Given the Hong Kong courts' repeated proclamations
that corporate property does not belong to the members of a com-
pany,30 it was legitimate for the defendants to assume that the separ-
ate personality of their company would have been respected. The
university regulations only required the defendants to declare that
neither they nor any of their relatives owned the property.3' The prac-
tice of using a company to hold properties was common enough in
Hong Kong that the university authority should have been aware of
the possibility.3 2 If the university authority had intended to prohibit
the use of the corporate form to circumvent the regulations, it could
28 [1999] 2 HKLRD 402, HKCA.
29 In that case, the defendants were actually charged with violating university
regulations on the use of housing allowance, which constituted a criminal offence
under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, which prohibits the deception of its
principal by an agent.
30 Good Profit Development Ltd v Leung Hoi [1992] 2 HKC 539, HKHC; Terrain Ltd
and Ors v Oriental Peer Co. Ltd [1988] 1 HKLR 246, HKCA.
31 [1999] 2 HKLRD 402 at 405.
32 This has been remarked upon by the Good Profit court.
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have expressly stated so. The defendants should not have been made
to suffer criminal consequences because of the university authority's
drafting oversight. There is in fact a close parallel between Leung Yat
Ming and the English case Tunstall v Steigman.3 3 Tunstall was not a
criminal case; it involved a statute governing the repossession rights
of a landlord. In that case, the court held that the landlord could not
repossess her property because the business that was going to occupy
the premises was owned by the landlord's company, not the landlord
herself. The court adopted a literal interpretation of the statute and
insisted on the distinct legal personalities of the landlord and her
company. The implicit belief of the court was that if Parliament
deemed this interpretation to be contrary to its intentions, Parliament
could amend the statute, which it did. The argument for a strict literal
interpretation is perhaps even stronger for a criminal statute.
This is the view expressed by Cardozo J, a prominent jurist who
went on to become a US Supreme Court justice, in Berkey v Third
Avenue Railway Corporation, a leading American corporate veil
case.3 4 In that case, the plaintiff attempted to recover from the parent
company for the personal injury she had sustained due to the negli-
gence of the employees of the subsidiary company. She argued that
the veil of the subsidiary should be pierced and the two companies
should be treated as one for the purpose of her compensation. How-
ever, piercing the veil would have also resulted in a violation of a
penal statute. Cardozo J asserted that 'no such inference is to be
drawn from acts so uncertain [ownership of shares and overlapping
personnel] in their suggestions where the inference is also one of the
commission of a crime. . . . an intention to operate a route in violation
of a penal statute is not to be inferred from acts which reasonably
interpreted are as compatible with innocence as with guilt'.3 5 He re-
fused to pierce the veil of the subsidiary to let the victim seek com-
pensation from the corporate parent. Cardozo J similarly believed that
it should be more, not less, difficult to pierce the veil in a criminal case.
Even the Hong Kong courts have not always shared the aggressive
stance of the Leung Yat Ming court on veil lifting in criminal cases. In
HKSAR v Sin Law Yuk Lin, the Court of Appeal, while affirming the
lower court's decision to lift the veil to establish a criminal violation,
did not treat the corporate veil issue any differently from its treatment
in a civil case. In fact, the Court of Appeal affirmed the application of
the legal standard for veil lifting laid down by Lord Keith of Kinkel in
Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council,36 which was a civil case. The
different sentiments expressed by Cardozo J and the Sin Law Yuk Lin
court notwithstanding, the fact remains that both the American and
33 [1962] 2 All ER 417, CA.
34 244 NY 84, 155 NE 58 (NY 1926).
35 Ibid. at 91-2.
36 1978 S.L.T. 159, HL.
215
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
the Hong Kong courts are considerably more willing to lift the veil in a
criminal case.
(b) Contract and Tort Cases
The Hong Kong courts' relatively cautious stance in contract cases as
compared to the other types of cases can be explained by the belief
that in a contract case, the parties had the opportunity to negotiate for
whatever terms and protections they desired. If a party neglected to
negotiate for a particular protection ex ante, it should not be allowed
to alter the contractual bargain ex post by way of veil lifting. Veil
lifting, after all, amounts to an ex post revision of the contractual
bargain. Bokhary JA encapsulated this view when he proclaimed in
China Ocean that 'it was Mitrans Panama who entered into the
charterparties and who assumed liabilities or obligations to the plain-
tiff thereunder. The plaintiff chose to deal with Mitrans Panama with-
out insisting on a guarantee.' 37 In that case, the plaintiff was trying to
recover from Mitrans Shipping, a company which shared many
senior employees with Mitrans Panama. The plaintiff had entered into
charterparties with Mitrans Panama without a guarantee from
Mitrans Shipping. Bokhary JA was clearly of the view that if the
plaintiff had wanted Mitrans Shipping to be liable for the charter-
parties, it should have demanded a guarantee in the initial contract
negotiation. The Mitrans companies probably would have asked for
something in return, perhaps in the form of higher fees for the
charterparties. This view is largely consistent with that of the English
courts and the arguments put forward by the law and economics
scholars from North America, such as Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel of the University of Chicago and Professors Halpern, Trebil-
cock and Turnbull of the University of Toronto.38
This author has not found any Hong Kong tort cases in which the
corporate veil doctrine was invoked. Therefore, there are no bases
upon which to predict how Hong Kong courts will decide corporate
veil claims in a tort case. Still, some non-tort precedents have pro-
vided useful clues. In China Ocean, Bokhary JA drew a distinction
between evasion and avoidance of legal obligations. He proclaimed
that:
Using a corporate structure to evade legal obligations is objectionable.
The courts' power to lift the corporate veil may be exercised to over-
come such evasion so as to preserve legal obligations. But using a cor-
porate structure to avoid the incurring of any legal obligation in the first
place is not objectionable. And the courts' power to lift the corporate
37 China Ocean Shipping Co. v Mitrans Shipping Co. Ltd [1995] 3 HKC 123, HKCA, at
para. 16.
38 P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock and S. Turnbull, 'An Economic Analysis of Limited
Liability in Corporation Law' (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal 117;
F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, 'Limited Liability and the Corporation' (1985) 52
University of Chicago Law Review 89.
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veil does not exist for the purpose of reversing such avoidance so as to
create legal obligations.39
This evasion-avoidance dichotomy has been endorsed in subsequent
cases.40 Evasion of existing legal obligations justifies veil lifting,
whereas using the corporate form to avoid the incurrence of legal
obligations in the first place is legitimate. In other words, the key to
deciding the validity of a corporate veil claim is the relative timing
between the incurrence of legal obligations and the incorporation.
The ease of application of this rule depends on the type of liability at
issue. The time of creation of a contractual obligation is probably
easily ascertainable. For torts that take place at a discrete point in
time, determination of the time of incurrence of liability will be sim-
ilarly straightforward. In contrast, it is not easy to determine when a
liability is incurred when the tort at issue takes place over time, such
as prolonged exposure to a harmful substance or other bodily harm.
For example, it will be difficult to determine when a liability is in-
curred if the tort involves daily exposure to deafening noise in a
workplace that results in an impairment of hearing. The impairment
takes place gradually over time and is the result of repeated exposure
to the noise. There is no single point in time at which the liability can
be said to arise.
Apart from the difficulty in application to certain tort claims, this
evasion-avoidance dichotomy will pose serious obstacles to a corpor-
ate veil claim in tort cases. In most cases, the company will be incor-
porated first, begins operation, and then a tort arises in its operation.
Under these circumstances, the legal obligation is incurred after in-
corporation, which means that the veil will not be lifted. It is by similar
reasoning that the English Court of Appeal rejected the corporate veil
claims in Adams v Cape Industries.41 The Court of Appeal was of the
view that there is nothing objectionable about a corporate group
sequestering its most hazardous operations within one subsidiary in
order to limit the liability exposure of the group. The one scenario in
which the veil may be lifted is when the members of a company that is
subject to tort liability close down the first company and incorporate a
new one to continue the existing operations. In that case, one may
argue that the tort obligation is incurred before the incorporation of
the second company. However, Adams has shown what the members
can do in order to insulate the second company from liability. In that
case, the second company, which was created after the tort liabilities
had arisen, was managed by the corporate parent through a complex
chain of ownership involving a dummy company in Liechtenstein.
39 [1995] 3 HKC 123, HKCA, at para. 17.
40 Liu Hon Ying v Hua Xin Enterprise (Hong Kong) Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 347, HKCF.
41 [1990] Ch 433, CA.
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That has effectively prevented the liability of the first company, the
original tortfeasor, from being imputed to the second company.
In sum, in light of the evasion-avoidance dichotomy laid down in
China Ocean, the Hong Kong courts probably will be more ready to
lift the veil in contract than in tort cases. For corporate veil claims to
have a greater chance of success in tort cases, the China Ocean di-
chotomy will need to be reformulated or perhaps confined to contract
cases. As China Ocean itself was a contract case, it is plausible to limit
the application of its rule to those cases.
(c) Statutory Cases
For corporate veil cases involving statutory claims, the success rate
between that for criminal cases and contractual cases is consistent
with the results of Thompson's surveys, and to some extent also with
the attitude of the English courts. It may be recalled that Thompson's
surveys showed that American courts are most willing to pierce the
veil in criminal cases, followed by statutory cases, and then by con-
tract cases. Thompson detected different degrees of willingness to
pierce the veil on the part of the American courts depending on the
statutes at issue. 2 At least according to his first survey, the American
courts were much more willing to pierce the veil in cases involving
employee pensions, environmental law, and patent law than workers'
compensation or tax statutes.43 As for the English corporate veil
cases, Professor Davies declared in his book that the 'doctrine of
lifting the veil plays a small role in British company law, once one
moves outside the area of particular contracts or statutes'. A quick
glance at the English corporate veil cases suggests that English courts
have shown considerable readiness to lift the veil in cases involving
statutory claims, including Re FG (Films),4 1 the DHN case, and a slew
of revenue cases. Enthusiasm for the corporate veil doctrine wanes in
contract cases. Notable examples of contract cases in which the sep-
arate corporate personality was upheld include Yukong Line v
Rendsburg Investment Corporation, Ord & Anor v Belhaven Pubs, and
Macaura v Northern Assurance.6
There have been only ten Hong Kong corporate veil cases involving
statutory claims so far. The claims have ranged from insolvency (one
case) to divorce (two), from maritime (two) to garnishment (one),47
42 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1060-2.
43 Ibid. at 1062, n. 135. Although in a later update of his survey, Thompson did find
that the courts' willingness to pierce the veil in pensions and environmental law
cases receded to the mean for all statutory cases.
44 See Davies, above n. 21 at 208-9.
45 [1953] 1 All ER 615, Ch D.
46 [1998] 1 WLR 294, QBD; [1998] BCC 607, CA; [1925] AC 619, HL.
47 The statute at issue in the case was the Transfer of Business (Protection of
Creditors) Ordinance.
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and from tax (one) to real property (one). There were two cases involv-
ing other kinds of statute. 48 Given the small sample size in each cat-
egory, no reliable generalizations can be made about variations in
judicial attitude towards different types of statutory claims. For what
it is worth, the Hong Kong courts have lifted the veil in every divorce,
garnishment, and tax case, and have refused to do so in every other
statutory case. The variations can be explained by the courts' recogni-
tion of the disparate policy rationales behind the statutes. Take matri-
monial law as an example. In W v H. and Another, Saunders J of the
Court of First Instance proclaimed that the corporate form will not be
allowed to frustrate the policy behind the Matrimonial Proceedings
and Property Ordinance:
In matrimonial proceedings the court will not hesitate to pierce the
corporate veil, and, where property is vested in a one-man company
which is the alter ego of the husband, disregard corporate ownership
and, without requiring a company to be joined at [sic] a party make an
order which has the same effect as the order that would be made if
corporate property were vested in the husband."
The judge proceeded to set aside the transactions that put the hus-
band's assets out of the wife's reach. Such an assertive stance is justi-
fied given the prevalent use of trusts and corporate vehicles in Hong
Kong to evade the property distribution rules in matrimonial law.
Thompson noted the same tendency of the American courts to tailor
the corporate veil doctrine to the policy rationale of the statute at
issue." In this respect, the Hong Kong and the American courts are
similar.
ii. The Number of Shareholders
Aside from the nature of claims at issue, another possible dimension
along which to gauge variations in judicial attitude is the type of
company at issue. For example, courts may exhibit different attitudes
towards veil lifting in public and private companies. Their attitude
may also vary depending on the number of members in the company.
Thompson found that the American courts did not pierce the veil
against a single public company among the over 1,600 cases in his
first survey." Of the 27 Hong Kong corporate veil cases in this survey,
only one of them, Re Wah Nam Group Ltd, involved a public com-
pany. 2 The Court of First Instance refused to lift the veil in that case. It
is of course difficult to draw any general conclusions from a one-case
48 These statute classifications are based on those used by Thompson in his survey.
This is done to allow comparison of results from the Hong Kong cases with those
from Thompson's surveys.
49 [2008] HKEC 766, HKCFI, at para. 169.
50 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1060-2.
51 Ibid. at 1047.
52 [2000] HKEC 875, HKCFL.
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sample group. 3 It is worth noting that in rejecting the corporate veil
claim in Re Wah Nam Group, the court put no emphasis on the fact
that the company at issue was a public one. While one should avoid
reading too much into this omission, it does leave open the possibility
that the Hong Kong courts may lift the veil against a public company
under appropriate circumstances.
Thompson found that the American courts' readiness to pierce the
veil is inversely related to the number of shareholders in the company.
His first survey showed that the American courts pierced the veil in 35
per cent of the cases involving companies with more than three share-
holders.5 The percentage increases to 46 per cent as the number of
shareholders drops to two or three. It further increases to close to 50
per cent for single-shareholder companies. This result is consistent
with the general belief that the greater is the number of shareholders,
the more likely it is that the court will treat the corporation as legit-
imate.55 Survey of the Hong Kong cases produced surprising results
on the correlation between the number of shareholders and the claim-
ant's success rate. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the Hong Kong
courts are more willing to lift the veil against companies with a larger
number of shareholders. The claimant success rate rises from 57 per
cent (four out of seven cases) for single-shareholder companies to 67
per cent (six out of nine cases) for companies with two or three
shareholders to 100 per cent (one out of one case) for companies with
more than three shareholders. It is unclear what accounts for this
trend. One possibility is that the Hong Kong courts may believe that
the greater number of members means a higher likelihood of full
recovery for the claimant once the veil is lifted. More shareholders
mean potentially a greater pool of assets to satisfy the claimant. How-
ever, a quick review of the cases shows that this concern did not seem
to have motivated the courts.
iii. The Identity of the Shareholders
Some North American commentators have argued that courts should
be less willing to lift the veil against individual shareholders as op-
posed to corporate shareholders, because with the latter group the
ultimate individual shareholders are still protected by limited liabil-
ity.A These individual shareholders are not deterred from investing in
corporate ventures, the encouragement of which is one of the main
purported benefits of limited liability. Some others have justified the
disparate treatment of corporate and individual shareholders on the
53 In fact, the proportion of Hong Kong cases involving public companies is already
higher than that for the American cases. In Thompson's first survey, only nine out
of 1,600 cases involved a public company.
54 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1055.
55 Ibid. at 1056.
56 See Easterbrook and Fischel, above n. 35 at 111; Krendl and Krendl, above n. 9 at
43; J. Landers, 'A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions
in Bankruptcy' (1975) 42 University of Chicago Law Review 589 at 619.
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grounds that a corporate shareholder has greater incentives to en-
gage in fraudulent inter-corporate transactions because the corporate
shareholder often operates its own business and stands to gain more
from such transactions."
Contrary to the argument of these commentators, results from
Thompson's surveys suggest that American courts in fact have been
more ready to pierce the veil against individual shareholders." Re-
sults from the survey of Hong Kong cases concur with Thompson's
results. The Hong Kong courts lifted the veil in 65 per cent (11 out of
17 cases) of the corporate veil cases involving individual shareholders,
and 14 per cent (one out of seven cases) of the cases featuring corpor-
ate shareholders." Even though the sample sizes are small, the dis-
crepancy in the success rates is significant enough to permit a
confident inference that Hong Kong courts lift the veil more readily
against individual shareholders. It is not entirely clear what accounts
for this discrepancy. One possibility is that corporate groups are more
likely to be legitimate businesses with substantial operations than
small companies owned by one or a few individuals. In one of the
most famous corporate veil cases in the US, Walkovszky v Carlton, the
New York Court of Appeal expressed this very sentiment.6 0 The same
act done by a corporate parent may carry greater legitimacy than if
done by an individual shareholder.61 For example, a corporate parent
nominating one of its employees as a subsidiary's director will prob-
ably sound less nefarious than an individual shareholder appointing
himself to the same position.
iv. Reasons Given by the Courts
Another important dimension along which to analyse variations in
judicial attitude are the reasons given by the courts to lift the veil. The
goal of the analysis is to determine how often the courts actually lifted
the veil after they concluded that there had been, say, an evasion of
existing legal obligations or an agency relationship between the mem-
bers and the company. In other words, the goal is to determine the
outcome predictiveness of each basis. The common bases given by the
English and the Hong Kong courts include agency, trusts, fraud, eva-
sion of existing legal obligation, group enterprise, justice, and the
single economic unit theory. In order to assess the outcome predic-
tiveness of these bases, this survey tallies the number of cases in
which the courts invoked these bases to justify veil lifting. It also
57 M. Eisenberg, 'Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate
Control' (1971) 84 Harvard Law Review 1577 at 1613.
58 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1056.
59 The Court of First Instance had lifted the veil against the corporate parent in
Horace Yao Yee Cheong v Pearl Oriental Innovation, but the judge was
subsequently overruled by the Court of Appeal. Horace Yao Yee Cheong v Pearl
Oriental Innovation Ltd [2009] HKEC 843, HKCA.
60 18 NY 2d 414, 223 NE 2d 6 at 8 (NY 1966).
61 See Thompson II, above n. 7 at 391.
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tallies the number of cases in which the court mentioned the absence
of these bases when refusing to lift the veil. These two tallies should
reveal the importance of these bases in a court's veil lifting decision.
A quick glance at the results of the tallies shows that unsurpris-
ingly, the most predictive basis is the presence or absence of fraud.
Fraud was invoked to justify veil lifting in six cases.62 Its absence
accounted for upholding of separate corporate personality in seven
cases. Similar to the English courts, the Hong Kong courts seem to
use the term fraud broadly. Nikkodo v Lam Chiu Kau aptly illustrates
this.63 Even though the Court of First Instance cited fraud as a basis
for imposing liability on the director-controlling shareholder, the con-
duct at issue was two specific misrepresentations. The first misrep-
resentation was that the company would pay for the goods it had
ordered, and the second that it would honour the cheques issued by it
on the dates stated on these cheques. Ngo Tai Hong v Endenne Devel-
opment Ltd is another case in which the court lifted the veil on the
grounds of fraud based on misrepresentations made by members of
the company." It is unclear whether the conduct at issue in these two
cases would have amounted to common law fraud. The courts did not
attempt to so establish. This is unsurprising given the exacting stand-
ard of proof of fraud required by the common law. Instead, the courts
seemed to have classified the conduct at issue as fraud simply based
on elements of dishonesty.
The prominence of fraud as a veil lifting basis among the Hong
Kong cases parallels the role of misrepresentation in the US corporate
veil jurisprudence. Thompson's surveys found that misrepresentation
was one of the most predictive factors of the outcome of a corporate
veil case. In cases in which misrepresentation was present, the Amer-
ican courts pierced the veil in 92.3 per cent of them." In cases in
which the absence of misrepresentation was noted, the courts upheld
separate corporate personality in 92.3 per cent of them." This com-
parable prominence of fraud and misrepresentation as a veil lifting
basis in their respective jurisdictions should come as no surprise as
these two terms often refer to similar conduct. In both jurisdictions
they often encompass general dishonest conduct." Take Endenne
Development as an example. The Hong Kong court characterized the
62 These six cases were: HKSAR v Leung Yat Ming [1999] 2 HKLRD 402, HKCA;
Nikkodo v Lam Chiu Kau [2000] 1 HKLRD 204, HKCFI; HKSAR v Sin Law Yuk Lin,
Agnes [2002] HKEC 622, HKCA; Lee Sow Keng Janet v Kelly McKenzie Ltd [2004] 3
HKLRD 517, HKCA; Ngo Tai Hong v Endenne Development Ltd [2005] HKEC 2120,
HKCA; and HKSAR v Lim Jackson Lung Hin [2006] HKEC 1165, HKCA.
63 [2001] 1 HKLRD 204, HKCFL.
64 [2005] HKEC 2120, HKCFI.
65 See Thompson I, above n. 7 at 1063.
66 Ibid. at 1065.
67 See Krendl and Krendl, above n. 9 at 28 (noting that misrepresentation should be
understood to encompass a wider range of actions than common law frauds).
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misrepresentations made by the members of the company as
fraudulent.
The second most frequently cited basis in the Hong Kong corporate
veil cases is the evasion of existing legal obligations. It was mentioned
in three successful cases." The absence of evasion was highlighted in
three cases in which the corporate veil claim failed.6 9 This suggests
that Adams, which discussed at some length the distinction between
avoidance and evasion of legal obligations, has had considerable im-
pact on the development of the Hong Kong corporate veil juris-
prudence. There is no direct equivalent of evasion of existing legal
obligations under the US corporate veil doctrine. The most similar
concept under US law would be asset stripping, which refers to the
'diversion of corporate assets from the corporation by or to a stock-
holder or other person or entity to the detriment of creditors'." In
particular, it may refer to the removal of assets from a company in
order to avoid an impending liability. A number of US cases, including
World Broadcasting System v Bass" and Henderson v Rounds &
Porter Lumber,n have held that evidence of asset stripping supports
the imposition of shareholder liability. Evasion of existing legal obli-
gations and asset stripping are functional equivalents to the extent
that assets of the first company are transferred to a second company.
In that case, the incurrence of legal obligation precedes the incorpora-
tion of the second company, and the veil will be lifted under Hong
Kong law, just as asset stripping may result in shareholder liability
under US law. If the corporate assets were only transferred to the
members without the involvement of a second company, however, no
existing legal obligations are evaded. Other company law doctrines
will have to be called upon to sanction the shareholders.
The remaining bases for veil lifting do not seem to have featured
prominently in the Hong Kong cases. The single economic unit theory
and group enterprise were mentioned in two successful corporate veil
cases each, while the absence of an agency relationship and a trustee
relationship between the members and the company was mentioned
in one and two cases respectively in which separate corporate per-
sonality was upheld. On the whole, it seems that fraud and evasion of
existing legal obligations are the only two reliable bases on which to
predict the outcome of a corporate veil case in Hong Kong.
68 These cases were: Centaline Property Agency Ltd v Cyberspeed Technology Co. Ltd
[2007] 4 HKLRD 745, HKDC; Lee Sow Keng Janet v Kelly McKenzie Ltd [2004] 3
HKLRD 517, HKCA; and Liu Hon Ying v Hua Xin State Enterprise (Hong Kong) Ltd
[2003] 3 HKLRD 347, HKCF.
69 These three cases were: China Ocean Shipping Ltd v Mitrans Shipping Co. Ltd
[1995] 3 HKC 123, HKCA; Maxgood International Ltd v Charter Victory International
Ltd [2001] 3 HKLRD 547, HKCFI; and Lee Thai Lai v Wong Chung Kai [2004] 1
HKLRD D12, HKCFL.
70 See Barber, above n. 9 at 375.
71 160 Tex. 261, 328 SW 2d 863 (Tex. 1959).
72 99 F. Supp. 376 (WD Ark. 1951).
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v. Trends Over Time
The last dimension along which to analyse the Hong Kong corporate
veil cases is temporal. Specifically, it is interesting to see whether the
Hong Kong courts' attitude towards veil lifting has changed over
time. A number of observations can be made. First, there has been a
substantial increase in corporate veil cases after 2000. Of the 27 cases
examined in this survey, 18 of them were decided in the 2000s. Five of
them were decided in the 1990s and four in the 1980s. The author has
not found a corporate veil case from before the 1980s. It is unclear
what explains the surge in corporate veil cases in the 2000s. One
hypothesis is that the number of corporate veil cases filed is correl-
ated with the state of the general economy. As the economy deterior-
ates, more companies struggle and become insolvent. Creditors
which are unable to recover their debts from the corporate assets
attempt to recover directly from the members by invoking the corpor-
ate veil doctrine.
After decades of continuous growth, the Hong Kong economy was
hit by a severe recession following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998.
The economy briefly recovered at the turn of the millennium, but took
a nosedive again after the burst of the dotcom bubble in the US in
2001 and the SARS epidemic in 2003. This is reflected in a rapid rise in
the number of voluntary bankruptcy petitions filed between 1998 and
2003. The number increased from 1,362 in 1998 to 5,487 in 2000 and
peaked in 2002 at 26,922 filings. 3 In the space of four years, the
number of voluntary petitions skyrocketed by close to 1,880 per cent.
The number began to drop in 2003 to 22,092 and then to 12,489 in
2004.74 The number of compulsory winding-up petitions filed also rose
dramatically over the same period. It rose from 723 in 1998 to 910 in
2000. It again peaked in 2002 at 1,292 petitions." Although the in-
crease is nowhere near as dramatic as that in the number of voluntary
petitions, it is still a staggering 79 per cent. Meanwhile, 11 of the 27
corporate veil cases in Hong Kong were filed between 1998 and 2003.
Some of them involved companies in financial trouble, such as Re
Nam Wah Group, Toptrans v Delta Resources, and Re Landune Inter-
national Limited.7 ' However, other corporate veil cases filed during
this period did not feature struggling companies and seemed to be
unrelated to the city's economic difficulty at the time. Therefore, the
hypothesis only partially explains the surge in corporate veil cases in
the 2000s.
73 Official Receiver's Office, Statistics on Compulsory Winding-up and Bankruptcy for
the Period 1-1998 to 12-2008, available at: http://www.oro.gov.hk/cgi-bin/oro/stat.
cgi?stat type=W&start year= 1998&start-month= 1&end-year=2008&end month=
12&Search=Search.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 [2000] HKEC 875, HKCFI; [2005] 1 HKLRD 635, HKCFI; [2005] 4 HKLRD 46, HKCA.
Even though Re Landune International was filed in 2004, the losses that led to the
company's winding up were sustained during the recession period up to 2003.
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The second observation about trends in the corporate veil cases
over time is a gradual increase in success rate. The claimant's success
rate rose from 25 per cent (one out of four cases) in the 1980s to 60 per
cent (three out of five cases) in the 1990s. The success rate has stayed
roughly the same since at 50 per cent (nine out of 18 cases) in the
2000s. Therefore, it seems that Adams has had a smaller impact on the
corporate veil jurisprudence in Hong Kong than in the UK, where it is
said to have reduced the corporate veil doctrine into insignificance.
Adams was decided in 1990 and the Hong Kong Court of Appeal cited
it extensively in China Ocean in 1995. Somewhat surprisingly, the
claimant's success rate in corporate veil cases has in fact risen since
Adams and China Ocean.
A review of the case law does not suggest any obvious reason for
the rise in claimant success rate since the mid-1990s. One possibility is
that the Hong Kong courts were only gaining familiarity with the
corporate veil doctrine in the 1980s and became more emboldened to
apply it in the 1990s. After all, Barki Bunker, the first case this author
was able to locate in which the claimant invoked the corporate veil
doctrine to impose shareholder liability, was only decided in 1985. The
court rejected the veil lifting claim in that case. The first successful
corporate veil case was Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Waylee
Investments, which was decided in 1988. Given the short history of the
doctrine, the Hong Kong courts may have only become accustomed to
it in the 1990s.
This explanation is supported by trends in the case law. The early
cases in which the courts lifted the veil were relatively easy cases.
Waylee Investments was a revenue case, which has traditionally seen
a higher success rate even in the UK." The Waylee court may have felt
more ready to lift the veil in light of the weight of the English author-
ities, which were still binding on Hong Kong courts at the time.
Million-Add Development v Secretary for Transport, which was a com-
pulsory purchase case similar to DHN, saw the Lands Tribunal lift the
veil solely on the authority of DHN. Leung Yat Ming and Secretary for
Justice v Lee Chau Ping 8 were criminal cases, which, rightly or
wrongly, have been perceived by the courts as easier cases for veil
lifting. The first successful corporate veil cases in Hong Kong involv-
ing contractual claims, Nikkodo and Yue Tai Plywood & Timber v Far
East Wagner Construction, were not decided until the early 2000s. The
first four contract cases, including China Ocean and Bakri Bunker, all
77 Revenue cases have included: Apthorpe v Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co. [18991 15
TLR 245, CA; Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Sansom [1921] 2 KB 492, CA;
Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd v Lewellin (Inspector of Taxes) [1957] 1 WLR 464,
HL; The Gramophone and Typewriter, Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89, CA; Littlewoods
Mail Order Stores Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1969] 1 WLR 1241, CA;
Southern v Watson [1940] 3 All ER 439, CA; and St. Louis Breweries, Ltd v
Apthorpe [1898] 15 TLR 112, QBD. English courts by and large have seemed to be
more willing to lift the veil in revenue cases.
78 [2000] 1 HKLRD 49, HKCFL.
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resulted in judgments for the defendants. This seems to suggest that
the success rate in the 1990s and 2000s may be the longer-term norm
in Hong Kong.
III. The Future of the Corporate Veil Doctrine in
Hong Kong
i. A Theoretical Discussion of the Limited Liability Principle
and the Corporate Veil Doctrine
The short history of the corporate veil doctrine in Hong Kong means
that there is still much room for evolution. While, historically, the
Hong Kong courts have by and large followed the lead of the English
courts when applying the doctrine, recent cases such as Lee Sow
Keng suggest that the local courts may be willing to go beyond their
English counterparts. It is therefore worth pondering the proper role
for the doctrine in Hong Kong company law.
At this juncture, it is important to recall the precise function of the
doctrine and its practical social impact. The corporate veil doctrine is
an exception to the general company law principle of limited share-
holder liability.79 Under this principle, liabilities incurred by the com-
pany, be they of contractual, tortious or other nature, are the
company's sole responsibilities. Absent exceptional circumstances,
the shareholders will not be held liable for them. If corporate assets
are insufficient to cover certain liability, the shortfall will have to be
borne by the counterparty. This counterparty may be a creditor of
various kinds."o He may be a financial creditor who has signed a loan
agreement with the company. He may be a trade creditor who has
agreed to supply goods to the company with or without a formal
agreement. He may be an employee who has signed an employment
contract with the company to offer his labour service to it. Further-
more, he may be a tort victim who has sustained an injury from the
company's business activities. For example, he may have been injured
by a company vehicle while the vehicle is on company business. Re-
gardless of the type of creditor, if corporate assets are insufficient to
meet the liability, the counterparty will be left to bear the loss.
Let us take the accident victim as an example. Assume that a com-
pany has assets worth HK$1 million (roughly E80,000). Its vehicle is
involved in an accident in which an individual is injured. The driver of
the company vehicle was clearly at fault and the company will be
adjudged fully liable to the individual for his injuries should the case
go to trial, even though the company has made its best effort to
supervise its drivers. The individual's medical expenses amount to
79 See Davies, above n. 21 at 198-9; L. Sealy and S. Worthington, Cases and Materials
in Company Law, 8th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) 61.
80 The term creditor is used in the general law and economics sense as opposed to
the technical sense.
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HK$1.2 million (roughly E100,000). Further assume that the victim is
uninsured and would have to cover these expenses out-of-pocket if he
was not compensated by the company. As mentioned earlier, the com-
pany only has assets worth HK$1 million. Therefore, even if the indi-
vidual prevails in the lawsuit, the maximum recovery will be only
HK$1 million. He will have to bear the remaining loss of HK$200,000
unless the corporate veil is lifted to impose personal liability on the
company's members. Absent circumstances that justify veil lifting, the
members will not be liable for the judgment against the company. The
company's business costs, which include the accident costs arising
from its business activities, have been externalized to the tort victim as
a result of limited liability. One can easily imagine other situations in
which a company's operations necessarily entail tort costs. Examples
include a company that operates an explosives factory or a chemicals
factory that emits hazardous pollutants into the air. If corporate assets
fell short of liabilities, the tort costs of the business operations would
be externalized. As has been argued persuasively by a number of
commentators, there are no reasons why innocent third parties and
society in general should subsidize business activities, especially haz-
ardous or polluting ones.81
It has been argued that the justification for imposing shareholder
liability is the strongest on behalf of tort victims, who generally do not
have a prior opportunity to negotiate with the company for protec-
tion.12 The justification for veil lifting is supposedly much weaker
when it comes to contractual creditors who have had a prior oppor-
tunity to negotiate with the company.83 Assuming that a contractual
creditor has had the opportunity to demand extra protection and is
adequately compensated for the default risks it bears (perhaps in the
form of a higher interest rate), there is no externalization of business
risks. It was mentioned earlier that there are three types of contractual
creditor: financial creditors, trade creditors, and employees. The vera-
city of these arguments depends on the extent to which these con-
tractual creditors do in fact receive compensation for potential
uncompensated losses.
There is little doubt that financial creditors are best positioned to
negotiate with the company for additional credit protection such as
shareholder personal guarantees. This is especially true for sophist-
icated financial creditors such as bank lenders. Loan transactions are
usually worth a significant enough amount that the lender wields
considerable bargaining power vis-a-vis the company. Bank lenders
are also well equipped to assess a company's default risks. These
81 See Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull, above n. 35 at 145-7; H. Hansmann and
R. Kraakman, 'Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts' (1990)
100 Yale Law Journal 1879 at 1888.
82 See Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull, above n. 35 at 145-7; Hamilton, above n. 9 at
988.
83 See Easterbrook and Fischel, above n. 35 at 104-9.
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lenders are repeat players in the loan market and have accumulated a
great deal of experience and expertise. For these creditors, veil lifting
does not seem justified because they can demand extra credit protec-
tion in advance. If they fail to do so through carelessness of their
own, they should be made to bear the consequence. Worse still, if they
have received higher interest as compensation, and the default event
materializes, they should not be allowed to renegotiate the original
loan agreement ex post through veil lifting. Allowing them to recover
from the members in such an event would amount to a windfall.
This line of reasoning does not apply to employees. For want of
bargaining power, very few employees are in a position to demand
extra compensation for the company's default risks. Given the fung-
ibility of most employees, a company can easily move on to the next
candidate if the first one asks for such compensation. In fact, most
employees will not even have adequate information or the skill to
assess their employers' default risks. The only exceptions may be
senior executives and managerial staff. Therefore, in general, limited
liability shifts a company's default risks onto its employees. When
corporate assets are insufficient to cover a company's wage liabilities,
it cannot be a defence against the imposition of shareholder liability
that the employees had the opportunity to demand extra compensa-
tion and neglected to do so. With employees, the case for overriding
limited liability is much stronger.
Trade creditors present the most diverse set of circumstances.
Some trade creditors transact business of sufficient volume and value
with the company that they may be in a good position to demand
extra credit protection or compensation for default risks. For other
trade creditors, the time costs of this negotiation outweigh the ex-
pected loss. One commonality among all trade creditors is that their
credit is usually of a short enough duration that the perceived default
risks are very low. This lowers their expected loss and causes many of
them to forego extra credit protection. On balance, in terms of their
ability and incentives to negotiate for extra protection, trade creditors
are more similar to employees than financial creditors. This means
that limited liability shifts corporate business costs onto trade cred-
itors. When commentators assert that externalization of business
costs does not apply to contractual creditors, they are focusing merely
on financial creditors. Externalization does affect trade creditors and
employees.
The most obvious response to this externalization argument is that
counterparties are free to seek insurance coverage for their risk
exposure to companies. A potential tort victim can purchase general
accident insurance or health insurance. A financial creditor can pur-
chase default protection, perhaps in the form of complex financial
instruments such as credit default swaps. A trade creditor and an
employee may be able to do the same. With adequate insurance
coverage, there will be no externalization of business costs by the
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company. This argument, however, is flawed because the purchase of
insurance is costly. The counterparty must pay a premium for the
insurance coverage. Provided that the insurance coverage is accur-
ately priced, the purchase of insurance does not eliminate the exter-
nalization of business costs. The only difference with an accurately
priced insurance coverage is that the counterparty, instead of bearing
the full loss in the event of an accident or default, bears its expected
loss adjusted for the probability of the accident or default. Business
costs are still borne by the counterparty in the form of insurance
premiums.
ii. The Corporate Veil Doctrine from a Development Perspective
Having established that limited liability does result in externalization
of business costs, the important question becomes whether the Hong
Kong society should accept it as an inevitable consequence of limited
liability. In order to answer this question, one needs to recognize the
benefits as well as the costs of limited liability. The discussion thus far
has focused on the costs of limited liability. This is an incomplete
picture, however, as limited liability serves important economic func-
tions. It helps to attract passive investments in corporate business
ventures. Under unlimited shareholder liability, passive investors
would be deterred from equity investments.8 4 Their inability to control
and lack of incentives to monitor corporate business decisions means
that passive investors could be potentially exposed to astronomical
liability under an unlimited liability regime.
This effect is more relevant for public companies; private com-
panies are less likely to attract substantial passive investments. This
does not mean that limited liability is of little value to private com-
panies. It performs important functions for them as well. Without
limited liability, entrepreneurs will hesitate to launch new business
ventures for fear of losing their entire personal fortunes. And if they
do launch such ventures, they may go through considerable trouble
and incur substantial expenses to put their personal assets beyond the
reach of their companies' creditors. This can be accomplished
through trusts and other complex financial structures. These expenses
are socially wasteful and could be avoided under limited liability. This
dampening effect on entrepreneurship, however, may be more appar-
ent than real. In Hong Kong, owners of private companies are often
required by their financial creditors to provide personal guarantees.
Many of them in reality do not enjoy limited liability protection.
Whether the Hong Kong society should make any adjustments to
limited liability boils down to a weighing of the costs and benefits of
the principle as delineated above. Adjustments to the principle can be
made through the corporate veil doctrine.
84 See Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull, above n. 35 at 136-8.
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One of the central arguments of this section is that the weighing of
these costs and benefits needs to take into account the state of eco-
nomic development of the jurisdiction at issue. A developing country
jurisdiction may justifiably take the view that entrepreneurship and
business investments should be encouraged to the extent possible,
including the use of limited liability to provide implicit subsidies to
companies. The need to provide such subsidies is much weaker for a
developed economy jurisdiction. To place this discussion in the con-
text of limited liability, strict adherence to limited liability may be
justified when an economy is undergoing rapid development. A more
flexible approach is called for in an advanced economy so that the
costs of limited liability can be kept in check.
The idea that development of legal doctrines should reflect the
state of economic development of the jurisdiction is not as novel as
it sounds. In fact, the history of US tort law and corporation law
is replete with examples of this. US tort and corporation law
doctrines were modified in the nineteenth century, when the US econ-
omy was undergoing rapid industrialization, to facilitate economic
development. One such modification was the shift from strict liability
to negligence as the common standard for tort liability from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards." This shift made it more difficult for
individuals to hold a corporation liable for injuries sustained from the
defendant's business activities. Around the same time, the US courts
also began to tinker with the doctrine of causation in torts to limit the
liability of big businesses, most notably railroads, for the injuries
caused by their activities.86 In fact, the introduction of limited liability
among the various states in the US in the early nineteenth century
was largely an effort to promote industrial growth." Many American
courts subsequently adopted decisions that tended to uphold the
separate personality of corporations." The incidental, or perhaps
even intended, effect of these decisions was to encourage
industrialization.89
In the case of Hong Kong, implicit subsidies to corporate ventures
were perhaps justified during the rapid economic development period
85 M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780 1860, 1st edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1977) 99-101. However, this thesis has been subsequently
challenged. See G. Schwartz, 'Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century
America: A Reinterpretation' (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1717.
86 M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, 1st edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1992) 57.
87 See Landers, above n. 52; E. Dodd, 'The Evolution of Limited Liability in American
Industry: Massachusetts' (1948) 61 Harvard Law Review 1351; D. Leebron, 'Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors' (1991) 91 Columbia Law Review 1565.
However, some scholars have argued that the introduction of limited liability did
not result in a proliferation of corporations, as was predicted. See K. Forbes,
'Limited Liability and the Development of Business Corporation' (1986) 2 Journal of
Law, Economics, & Organization 163; P. Blumberg, 'Limited Liability and Corporate
Groups' (1986) 11 Journal of Corporation Law 573.
88 See Hamilton, above n. 9 at 980.
89 Ibid.
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from the 1950s to 1980s, when the city was poor and many local
businesses were struggling to establish themselves. Similar to the US
in the nineteenth century, Hong Kong underwent rapid industrializa-
tion between the 1950s and 1980s. Prior to the Korean War, Hong
Kong was largely a trade entrep~t between China and the rest of the
world.90 However, the embargo imposed by the United Nations dur-
ing the Korean War ended that trade and forced Hong Kong to look
for economic alternatives." After the Communist takeover, many
Shanghainese businessmen fled to Hong Kong with capital and know-
how in industries such as textiles, garments, toys, and inexpensive
electronics.92 Despite this rapid industrialization, the GDP per capita
of Hong Kong was still relatively low at the time. It was only US$4,744
at the end of the 1960s in 2005 dollars, roughly one-quarter that of the
United Kingdom.93 Although limited liability had been introduced to
Hong Kong long before its industrialization began, businesses needed
whatever advantages they could obtain during this period of rapid
economic growth. The imperative of industrialization and economic
growth means that the benefits of limited liability were significant and
outweighed its costs, which in turn means that limited liability should
be vigorously defended.
As the economy continued to grow, the city became wealthier. With
the Open Door Policy of China starting in 1979, many Hong Kong
businessmen moved their factories to China to take advantage of the
almost inexhaustible supply of cheap labour across the border." The
city began to transition to a service-based economy. By 1996, the city's
GDP per capita had risen to about US$25,300, only slightly below that
of the US."5 By 2007, GDP per capita had reached US$30,900." Ac-
cording to the US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook,
Hong Kong was ranked No. 15 in the world in terms of GDP per
capita measured in purchasing power parity, 17 places higher than
the UK.97 It is clear that by the 1990s, the economy was sufficiently
advanced that there was no longer any pressing need to promote
industrialization and subsidize business activities. The benefits of
limited liability have now waned, and the weighing of the costs and
90 T. Hagelin, 'Reflections on the Economic Future of Hong Kong' (1997) 30 Vanderbilt
Journal of International Law 701 at 706; HKSAR Government, 2008 Hong Kong
Yearbook, 1st edn (HKSAR Information Services Department: Hong Kong, 2008)
420.
91 See 2008 Hong Kong Yearbook, above n. 86 at 420.
92 Ibid.
93 The GDP per capita of the United Kingdom in 1969 was US$17,403. US Department
of Agriculture, Real Historical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita and
Growth Rates of GDP Per Capita for Baseline Countries/Regions (in 2005 dollars)
1969-2009, available at: www.ers.usda.gov/Data/.. ./Data/HistoricalRealPerCapita
IncomeValues.xls (data source: ERS International Macroeconomic Dataset).
94 See Hagelin, above n. 86 at 707.
95 Ibid.
96 See Hong Kong Yearbook, above n. 86 at 41.
97 US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.
231
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
benefits needs to be recalibrated to reflect the evolving socio-
economic environment of the city.
The important question is how to achieve this recalibration under
Hong Kong law. If the principle of limited liability were not so deeply
entrenched in the legal system of, and the business culture in, Hong
Kong, and almost every other advanced economy for that matter,
there may be room for revisiting it, as has been argued by some North
American scholars." However, it is too late in the development of
Hong Kong company law to question the validity of the principle. The
best alternative is to expand the application of the corporate veil
doctrine beyond cases involving fraud and criminal convictions.
Through more judicious use of the doctrine, the occasionally harsh
effects of limited liability can be alleviated. The high claimant success
rate in corporate veil cases indicated in Section II may suggest that
the Hong Kong courts have already been doing that. However, in
many of these cases, externalization of business costs was not impli-
cated. In only a few cases was the corporate veil doctrine used to
tackle the problem. Lee Sow Keng and Yue Tai Plywood & Timber were
two notable examples. In the remaining cases, the veil was lifted for a
variety of reasons that do not concern limited shareholder liability.
For example, in Endenne Development, the veil was lifted in order to
hold the defendants liable for misrepresentation, which the defend-
ants were able to accomplish with the help of their corporate vehicle.
This is different from the typical scenario of externalization of busi-
ness costs, where a bona fide company shifts its business costs onto
outside parties by virtue of its insufficient assets. Therefore, the ade-
quate recalibration will entail a reformulation of the corporate veil
doctrine in Hong Kong.
It cannot be the case that the doctrine applies anytime there is
externalization of business costs, which would be tantamount to a
repeal of limited liability. Some limiting principles on the doctrine are
necessary. While a full discussion of the reformulation of the doctrine
is beyond the scope of this paper, a few initial ideas can be offered.
One possibility is an expansion of the evasion of existing legal obliga-
tions rule to encompass obligations that were reasonably foreseeable
at the time of incorporation. This means that if a company chooses to
enter a line of hazardous business activity, the court may find that
accidents arising from the activity are reasonably foreseeable. An
evasion of reasonably foreseeable legal obligations rule would allow a
court to lift the veil. Another possibility is for the courts to pay greater
attention to whether a company is adequately capitalized for its pro-
posed business. Evidence of grossly inadequate capitalization may
justify veil lifting. The courts may need to formulate certain objective
standards for adequacy of capitalization and take into consideration
98 See Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull, above n. 35 at 145-7; Hansmann and
Kraakman, above n. 77 at 1879-82.
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subjective facts of the case, such as the incorporators' intent. In
fact, adequacy of capitalization and reasonable foreseeability of legal
obligations can be combined as one single test for veil lifting cases
where fraud is absent.
A reformulated corporate veil doctrine will not address externaliza-
tion of corporate business costs in all instances. However, this cannot
be achieved absent a dramatic curtailment of limited liability. Having
decided that the limited liability principle is too entrenched to be
revisited at this point, compromises that do not address every in-
stance of externalization of corporate business costs must be
accepted.
IV. Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to provide some clarity on the corporate veil
doctrine in Hong Kong. With a comprehensive survey, the case law
was analysed along the following dimensions: the nature of the under-
lying claims at issue, the nature of the company, the number and
identity of the shareholders in the company, the reasons given by the
courts, and the time at which the case was decided. Results of the
survey suggest that some of the common perceptions about the doc-
trine are inaccurate. For example, a general belief is that the Hong
Kong courts are averse to the corporate veil doctrine. The survey
debunked this belief and showed that the Hong Kong courts have
applied the doctrine quite actively. They have lifted the veil in more
than 50 per cent of the cases in which the doctrine was invoked. The
survey confirmed that the US and Hong Kong cases share the same
trend in success rate across case types. The Hong Kong courts are the
most ready to lift the veil in criminal cases, then statutory cases, and
lastly contract cases. Surprisingly, no corporate veil claim has ever
been raised in a tort case in Hong Kong.
Unsurprisingly, the Hong Kong courts have never lifted the veil
against a public company. However, in contrast to their American
counterparts, the Hong Kong courts are more likely to lift the veil as
the number of shareholders in the company increases. This is a some-
what counter-intuitive result. Among the bases commonly invoked by
the Hong Kong courts to lift the veil, fraud and evasion of existing
legal obligations are the only two that have featured frequently
enough among the cases to be of any predictive significance. Lastly, it
was discovered that judicial attitude towards the doctrine has ebbed
over time. Claimant success rate rose substantially from the 1980s to
the 1990s, and has held steady since. No obvious explanation presents
itself for this trend. One possibility is that the Hong Kong courts only
became comfortable enough with the doctrine in the 1990s to apply it
on a regular basis.
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This paper also suggests a possible future direction for the corpor-
ate veil doctrine by putting it in a development perspective. The argu-
ment is premised on the realization that limited liability results in the
externalization of business costs onto contractual and tortious cred-
itors of a company. This externalization is tantamount to an implicit
subsidy for corporate business activities. At the same time, limited
liability serves some very important purposes by encouraging entre-
preneurship and corporate business investments. The extent to which
the limited liability principle should be adhered to depends on a
weighing of the costs and benefits of the principle. One further prem-
ise of the argument is that the benefits of limited liability diminish as a
society becomes more developed economically. What this means is
that there are fewer persuasive justifications for a strict adherence to
limited liability in an advanced economy like Hong Kong's. Under
appropriate circumstances, the corporate veil doctrine should be used
to rectify the externalization of corporate business costs. This would
allow limited liability to continue to serve its useful functions without
producing unduly harsh effects on the counterparties of companies.
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